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Theses
1.	 The murders of the investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fi-
ancée in February 2018 became the catalyst for the civic outrage 
that has brought about significant changes on the Slovak politi-
cal scene. This has mainly affected the long-ruling party Smer-
SD and its leader Robert Fico, who resigned as prime minister 
under public pressure. However, the main opposition forces 
have benefited from the protests to only a small degree, as large 
sections of society perceive the opposition leaders as unreliable. 
New political projects have benefited from the social agitation, 
primarily the Progressive Slovakia party, co-founded by Zu-
zana Čaputová who won the presidential election in March on 
a wave of slogans calling for the repair of the state and the res-
toration of justice. The outgoing President Andrej Kiska is also 
forming his own political party with a centrist agenda.
2.	 The investigation into Kuciak’s murder contributed to the dis-
closure and publication of reports about informal links be-
tween politicians, business and the criminal underground. 
This allowed many Slovaks to see the scale of the pathology 
which has developed in their country during the rule of Smer. 
However, despite the defeat for Robert Fico’s party in the presi-
dential elections, it still tops the polls with about 20% support, 
as it meets the demand of a large part of society for a sense of 
security and predictability. For many Slovaks Smer has been 
a guarantor of economic and social stability, which in recent 
years Fico has bolstered with his use of strong anti-immigrant 
rhetoric. Smer also skilfully plays upon ideological questions, 
and – by rejecting the liberal ideas prevailing in Western Euro-
pean social democracy – has come to play the role of defender 
of the status quo. There are also the tangible successes which 
Slovakia has achieved during the rule of Smer: the country 
has entered the Schengen zone and joined the eurozone, and 
within that group it can be proud of the good state of its public 
finances, despite its lavish spending on social policy.
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3.	 For years one of the sources of Smer’s success has been the 
weakness of the centre-right opposition. The opposition is 
united by its very harsh criticism of Smer and its willingness 
to draw upon the demands to clean up politics which were 
raised by the anti-government protests organised after Ku-
ciak’s death under the slogan ‘For a decent Slovakia’ (Za slušné 
Slovensko). For years, however, the centre-right’s main prob-
lems have been its fragmentation, personal disputes, and 
significant policy differences concerning both economic and 
ideological questions, as well as their varying European agen-
das. This internal friction has been effectively exploited by 
Smer, which depicts the opposition as unable to cooperate and 
discredited by numerous scandals. A prerequisite for remov-
ing Smer from power, therefore, is that the opposition parties 
should at least dispense with the attacks on each other and 
agree on a pre-election strategy, which the leaders are in-
creasingly beginning to realise. However, this is still a slow 
process, and is being accompanied by the fragmentation of the 
political scene due to the creation of new political formations.
4.	 The classic division between the governing and opposition 
parties in Slovakia has been affected by a third element: the 
rise of anti-system forces. These use media outlets spreading 
disinformation (mainly on the internet), which are popular 
in Slovakia, and can effectively mobilise the most frustrated 
voters by offering quick solutions to problems which have ex-
isted for years (such as the vast differences in development be-
tween the regions, and the social exclusion of the Roma popu-
lation). These anti-system forces undermine confidence in the 
state’s institutions as well as the EU and NATO, and demand 
a redefinition of foreign policy under the slogan of ‘recovering 
sovereignty’. In fact, however, their foreign policy demands 
are largely in line with the narrative coming from the Krem-
lin. The main representatives of this trend in March presiden-
tial elections, Štefan Harabin and Marian Kotleba, received 
almost a quarter of the votes cast in the first round. In next 
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year’s parliamentary elections, Kotleba’s party could win over 
most of this electorate, as shown by opinion polls which give it 
up to 14% of popular support.
5.	 The parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2020 will 
witness a clash between the three political camps: the ruling 
party, which consists of rising numbers of conservative so-
cial democrats and nationalists; the centre-right and liberal 
opposition, which is united almost exclusively by its harsh 
criticism of Fico’s party; and the anti-system parties, whose 
strength is growing despite the country’s strong economic 
performance. The final form of these camps is not a foregone 
conclusion, however, as their ranks are still being reshuffled. 
There are many signs that Smer’s campaign narrative will be 
based on a fight to defend its generous social policies as well 
as the traditional values to which (in their opinion) the op-
position poses a threat. For its part, the opposition will stress 
the need for healing the state, and for those guilty of abuses of 
power under Smer to be brought to account. The shape of the 
future government will largely depend on how much support 
Kotleba’s party gets as its power grows, and on whether it will 
continue to be marginalised on the political scene.
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InTroducTIon
The presidential elections in March 2019 clearly demonstrated 
the battle lines and the scale of divisions within the Slovak so-
ciety. The main axis of these divisions is the public’s attitude to-
wards the strongest party in the ruling coalition – Smer – sociál-
na demokracia [Direction – Social Democracy], led by the former 
Prime Minister Robert Fico, which with one brief interruption 
(2010-12) has held power in Slovakia since 2006. However, an 
increasingly important role is being played by the split between 
supporters of Slovakia’s further integration into Western struc-
tures and opponents of the pro-Western elites who seek to radi-
cally redefine the state’s foreign policy under the banner of de-
fending its sovereignty. Taking this into account, Slovak society 
can be divided into three main groups: those who demand that the 
discredited elites leave office and that the functioning of the state 
be improved, though without any major change in foreign policy; 
those who primarily want stability and are afraid of major chang-
es; and those who want to replace the elites and are demanding 
radical change to the country’s political system and foreign policy.
The proponents of changes, both radical and moderate, consider 
Smer to be an emanation of the capture of the state by criminal-
oligarchic networks, and want new politicians to ‘restore Slovakia 
to its citizens’. The more moderate part of this group of society is 
represented by the lawyer and social activist Zuzana Čaputová, 
who won the presidential elections with 58% of the vote; she has 
come to embody this group’s hopes of improving the functioning 
of the state. Her opponent Maroš Šefčovič, who was supported by 
Smer (but won just under 42% of the vote in the second round) 
gained support mainly from people who value political, econom-
ic and social stability. Smer meets those expectations because 
it guarantees stable economic growth and generous social pro-
grammes; in addition it has opposed admitting immigrants from 
Muslim countries, and maintains an ideologically conservative 
attitude. Most supporters of radical changes did not vote in the 
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second round of the presidential elections, which resulted in a low 
overall turnout (under 42 percent). In the first round, however, 
they supported the anti-system candidates who won a total of 25% 
of the votes, thanks to their demands for a radical reformulation 
of Slovakia’s membership in the EU and NATO, or even to leave 
these structures altogether. This division into three sections held 
fast during the European Parliamentary elections in May 2019. 
The top three places were taken by a coalition of two new opposi-
tion parties (including Progressive Slovakia, which Čaputová co-
founded), Smer, and Marian Kotleba’s anti-system party.
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I. The crIsIs of confIdence In The polITIcal 
class
The murder of the investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fian-
cée in February 2018 became a catalyst for public outrage which 
led to significant changes on the Slovak political scene. Most of 
Kuciak’s articles concerned the suspicious ties between politi-
cians and business, which for years had gone untouched by the 
police and the courts. The main demands of the ‘For a decent Slo-
vakia’ protests, the biggest the country had seen since 1989, were 
thus to establish the reasons for the murders, to resolve the scan-
dals which had been uncovered by Kuciak and others, and bring 
about the resignations of leading politicians. The demonstrations 
were effective in leading to the resignations of long-time prime 
minister Robert Fico, his close associate and interior minister 
Robert Kaliňák, and the chief of police, among others1. 
After these changes, under the influence of strong public pressure 
and the expectations of Slovakia’s foreign partners, investiga-
tions into the scandals associated with Smer started to accelerate. 
As a result, reports began to appear revealing the enormous net-
work of informal links between politics, business and the crimi-
nal world which had grown up during Smer’s rule. 
The businessman accused of ordering the murder, Marián 
Kočner, had maintained close contacts with important politi-
cians in Smer, key figures in the police and the prosecutor’s office, 
the owners of the influential financial group Penta, and others. 
He sometimes acted as a business partner for them, but he was 
mainly a valuable source of incriminating information, which 
he obtained through cooperation with former agents of the in-
telligence services, whom he commissioned to spy on politicians 
1 J. Groszkowski, in cooperation with K. Dębiec, ‘Początek końca rządu Roberta 
Ficy’ [The beginning of the end of Robert Fico's government], Analizy OSW, 
14 March 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2018-03-14/
poczatek-konca-rzadu-roberta-ficy.
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and journalists. Kočner had remained unpunished until Kuciak’s 
murder thanks to protection from his contacts. Another figure 
who long enjoyed great freedom of action was the developer 
Ladislav Bašternák, who in 2018 was convicted of a multimillion-
euro tax fraud; he also gained public notoriety when it transpired 
that Fico had been living in an apartment rented from him since 
20122. It is true that for many years the opposition and the me-
dia had widely reported the links between Smer politicians and 
Kočner & Bašternák, as well as many other scandals in which the 
party was implicated, but nevertheless they did not damage the 
ruling party’s popularity to any great extent.
Fico’s party has held an unchallenged lead in the polls for a long 
time. However, the common belief about the impunity of Smer’s 
business environment has had a clear negative impact on public 
confidence in the judiciary. Among the EU nations, only the Cro-
ats have a more critical view of the independence of their judici-
ary than the Slovaks. This distrust has been displayed not only by 
the residents of Bratislava, who tend to favour the current opposi-
tion, but also in the eastern regions of Slovakia, whose residents 
traditionally support Smer to a greater degree3.
2 Towards the end of May 2019, the local media reported that the former Prime 
Minister was to move out of this apartment ‘in the next few weeks’; this came 
after a court decision to announce an auction of Bašternák’s properties which 
have been taken over by the state.
3 The survey carried out in January 2018 (just before Kuciak’s murder) for the 
European Commission’s 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard report shows that only 29% 
of Slovaks thought their courts were independent, while 58% thought the op-
posite. Similar results were obtained in a study in January 2019 (28% believe 
the courts are independent, 60% say the opposite). Slovakia’s result was the 
second-worst in the EU, after Croatia. Slovaks see pressure from politicians 
as well as business and other interest groups as the main causes for the lim-
ited independence of the judiciary. Cf. The European Commission, The 2018 EU 
Justice Scoreboard, Luxembourg 2018: ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/jus-
tice_scoreboard_2018_en.pdf; and the European Commission, The 2019 EU 
Justice Scoreboard, Luxembourg 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/
files/justice_scoreboard_2019_en.pdf, and also the source material for the 
2018 data: ‘Flash Eurobarometer 461: Perceived independence of the nation-
al justice systems in the EU among the general public’: http://data.europa.
eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2168_461_ENG and ‘Flash Eurobarometer 474: 
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In spring 2019, intensive work by the police and prosecutors 
helped the Slovak people to recover their trust in the state institu-
tions (at least partially). Kočner is in custody accused of commit-
ting economic crimes and having ordered Kuciak’s murder, while 
Bašternák has been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and 
the confiscation of property obtained from criminal proceedings. 
However, for a large part of society, the information disclosed 
during these investigations is evidence that Smer not only toler-
ated this criminal state of affairs, but was even jointly responsible 
for it. EU institutions are also increasingly turning their attention 
to these matters. Two days before the second round of the presi-
dential elections, the European Parliament even passed a resolu-
tion which included an expression of concern about the emerging 
allegations of “corruption, conflict of interest and impunity” in 
Slovakia’s ruling circles4.
For years, Smer’s response to accusations of corruption and its 
opaque links with business has been to attack its political oppo-
nents. As a result, public debate in Slovakia largely boils down to 
mutual accusations of a personal nature from both the opposition 
and the ruling coalition. When Smer presents materials which 
compromise their political opponents, they usually contain true 
information (for example, reports of fraud in the accounts of 
a company co-owned by the former President Andrej Kiska); this 
allows it to suggest that the opposition is not free from the pathol-
ogy of which it accuses the ruling camp.
Perceived independence of the national justice systems in the EU among the 
general public’: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.
cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/86022. 
4 Cf. European Parliament, ‘Situation of rule of law and fight against corruption 
in the EU, specifically in Malta and Slovakia’, 28 March 2019, http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-
2019-0328+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. Given that the resolution was passed two 
days before the second round of presidential elections, it was interpreted in 
the Slovak media as interference in the country’s political process, although 
the resolution itself did not become the subject of any broader public debate.
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A side effect of this defensive strategy is the loss of public confi-
dence in the entire political class. Among the party leaders, the 
least trusted is Robert Fico, who has a negative rating from up to 
73% of Slovaks. Yet the leaders of the main opposition parties are 
not in a much better situation: between 60 and 70% of respondents 
profess a lack of confidence in them5. This distrust of the political 
class is reflected in electoral participation. The turnout in the sec-
ond round of the presidential elections (41.8%) was the lowest in 
history. Regularly less than 50% of those eligible to vote in local 
elections do so (in 2018 the figure was 48.7%), and fewer than 30% 
do so in regional polls (the result of almost 30% in 2017 was the 
highest in history). In elections to the European Parliament the 
turnout never exceeded 23%, and each time it has been the lowest 
in the EU6. 
Against this background, the country’s parliamentary elections 
look relatively good; more than 50% of eligible voters regularly 
turn out, and in the last ones (2016) the highest figure for twelve 
years was recorded, at nearly 60 percent. 
Lower turnouts favour the anti-system People’s Party – Our Slo-
vakia (ĽSNS) of Marian Kotleba, which has a strongly motivated 
electorate. Slovak society’s growing disillusionment in politics 
as such is also shown by the rising electoral popularity of people 
from outside politics: after the recent local elections, as many as 
42% of communal heads and mayors do not belong to any group 
5 ‘Dôvera/nedôvera k vybraným politikom – jún 2019’, Agentúra Focus, 9 May 
2018, http://www.focus-research.sk/files/n252_Dovera_nedovera%20k%20
vybranym%20politikom_jun%202019.pdf.
6 On the one hand, this testifies to Slovak politicians’ incapacity to mobilise 
their electorate on European issues. On the other, as many as 41% of Slo-
vaks believe that the European Parliament should play a smaller role than 
it does at present (the average figure for the EU-28 is 27%), while 35% think 
the opposite (the EU average is 48%). Cf. European Parliament, ‘Parlemeter 
2018–Taking up the challenge: From (silent) support to actual vote’, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/
parlemeter-2018-taking-up-the-challenge. 
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(a rise of 4 percentage points compared to previous elections). 
This trend can be clearly seen in the big cities, with Bratislava at 
the forefront; the new mayor is a 40-year-old architect and urban 
activist. In smaller towns, however, politicians who only formally 
stand as ‘non-party local government’ candidates in fact maintain 
the local business-party ties.
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II. smer, or slovakIa’s ‘lITTle sTabIlIsaTIon’ 
Smer, despite recording a marked decline in its popularity since 
the 2012 parliamentary elections, which it won with a score of 
44%, is still the leader in the polls, with the support of about 20% 
of voters. 
This continued high level of Smer’s popularity is due in large part 
to Peter Pellegrini, who replaced Fico as Prime Minister in March 
2018. Unlike his predecessor, he operates in a more consensual 
manner, and has placed greater emphasis on keeping the func-
tioning of the state transparent. As a result, he is the only leading 
politician who is trusted by more than half of Slovaks. His atti-
tude contrasts with the behaviour of Fico, who has been known 
for his intemperate language and conflicts with the majority of 
the press. Meanwhile, tension is rising within Smer between 
Pellegrini and Fico, who still heads the party; the latter has for 
several years been looking for a place to spend the rest of his po-
litical career (in 2014 he stood in the presidential elections with-
out success, and in 2019 he unsuccessfully attempted to become 
the head of the Constitutional Court). The rising tensions within 
Smer became perceptible after the European Parliament elections 
in May 2019, which saw the party’s first losses in a purely party-
level national contest since the European elections in 20047. These 
tensions were expressed in a letter from party activists in Košice, 
who demanded Fico’s resignation as head of Smer, and that the 
party should be ‘cleansed’ of the suspicions which have caused 
it both to lose popularity among the electorate and membership 
within the party itself. If the current Prime Minister took control 
of the party, his good personal ratings would help the party regain 
some voters, but such a change is unlikely, especially before the 
elections scheduled for spring 2020. As the keystone of various 
7 Smer's result of just under 16% placed it second behind a coalition made up 
of the liberal party Progressive Slovakia and the centrist party Together 
(Spolu), which won just over 20% of votes.
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interest groups, Fico has proved again and again that he retains 
full control of Smer.
Supporters of Smer associate the party with the successes Slo-
vakia has enjoyed during its rule. When Fico was prime minis-
ter, Slovakia joined the eurozone and entered the Schengen area, 
and the vast majority of the population (also thanks to Smer’s 
rhetoric) is still convinced of the benefits of the single European 
currency and EU membership8. Moreover, during the econom-
ic crisis, Fico’s government conducted a responsible budgetary 
policy, and when things improved, it spread the wealth around 
in the form of various social packages (such as free lunches in 
schools and kindergartens, and free train travel for students 
and pensioners), while maintaining a relatively small budget 
deficit (1.04% of GDP in 2017 and 0.7% of GPD in 2018, the lowest 
in the state’s history). 
For many Slovaks, then, Smer has been the guarantor of eco-
nomic and social stability. This image has been boosted by Fico’s 
strong anti-immigrant rhetoric, which is intended to convince 
a public relatively uncomfortable with people from other cul-
tures that the Smer government will ensure security for the 
country9. Fico has also skilfully played upon ideological issues, 
presenting himself as the defender of the status quo. Contrary to 
8 Three-quarters of Slovaks ‘agree’ with EU membership, and around 80% 
are satisfied with the ability to use the euro. Cf. ‘Súhlas s členstvom SR 
v EU–april 2018’, Agentúra Focus, 9 May 2018; http://www.focus-research.
sk/files/246_Suhlas%20s%20clenstvom%20SR%20v%20EU_april%202018.
pdf; ‘Slovenská dekáda s eurem. Lidé si zvykli, osm z deseti to neměnilo’, 
iDnes.cz, 17 January 2019, https://www.idnes.cz/ekonomika/zahranicni/
euro-slovensko-deset-let-vyroci.A190117_152043_eko-zahranicni_svob.
9 According to the report Discrimination in the EU in 2015 prepared for the Eu-
ropean Commission, Slovakia has the lowest proportion in the EU of people 
who would feel comfortable working with a black person (48%), someone 
from Asia (49%), a Jew (57%), a Buddhist (51%), and the second lowest (after 
the Czech Republic) with a Muslim (37%). Cf. Special Eurobarometer 437-Dis-
crimination in the EU in 2015, the European Commission, October 2015, http://
ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSur-
veyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2077.
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the prevailing trends in European social democracy (but in ac-
cordance with the will of most of Slovak society), he has rejected 
the possibility of introducing civil partnerships for same-sex 
couples (the project was initially proposed by the opposition SaS 
party, which paradoxically is a member of the European Con-
servatives and Reformists political group) or their adoption of 
children10. Moreover, he has announced that the Pellegrini gov-
ernment will not ratify the Istanbul Convention, signed by the 
previous centre-right coalition, which conservative groups have 
criticised. At the same time, however, most of Smer’s MPs ab-
stained from an attempt in parliament to limit the legal options 
for performing abortions, which in this regard have remained 
relatively liberal11.
Ideological matters also played an important role in the presiden-
tial election campaign in 2019. Šefčovič, endorsed by Smer, pre-
sented himself as a defender of ‘traditional values’, and attacked 
Čaputová for her liberal views on moral issues (such as her accept-
ance of the adoption of children by same-sex couples), in which he 
was echoed by leading Smer activists. However, the election result 
showed that this strategy has its limitations. Although Čaputová 
made no secret of her controversial views, she effectively down-
played their importance, declaring that political changes in such 
matters require a broad consensus, and were not part of her elec-
toral programme. As a result Čaputová – whose campaign slogans 
focused on the struggle for an honest and fair Slovakia – attracted 
not only liberal voters, but also many conservatives as well.
10 According to a recent survey by the Focus agency (from 2016), 58% of Slovaks 
were ‘strongly against’ the possibility of children being adopted by same-sex 
couples, and another 17% were ‘somewhat against’: a total of three-quarters 
of the Slovak public. According to the same survey, 69% of Slovaks were op-
posed to marriage between persons of the same sex, and 56% were against 
their civil partnerships.
11 In contrast to the Czech Republic, doctors in Slovakia have the right to refuse 
to perform or assist in abortions. According to a 2018 survey by Focus, similar 
percentages of Slovaks (47 and 48%) favour maintaining the abortion status 
quo and limiting the possibility of conducting abortions.
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However, it appears from Fico’s reaction to Čaputová’s victory in 
the presidential election that the fight against the ‘ultraliberal-
ism’ attributed to her will also be an important element of Smer’s 
strategy before the parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 
2020. This means that Smer intends primarily to mobilise its most 
loyal voters, and to reach out to the electorate of its coalition part-
ner, the Slovak National Party (SNS), even at the cost of losing its 
more moderate electorate’s support. The SNS is trying to outbid 
Smer in its social welfare promises; but at the same time, like 
Smer, it has strong links with business, including the millionaire 
Anton Siekel and the Slavia Capital Group. These figures are active 
in the tourism industry, on whose behalf the SNS has conducted 
vigorous lobbying. The head of the SNS, Andrej Danko, has done 
a lot to boost the party; when he took over it had no parliamen-
tary seats (currently it has about 6–7% support). But his numerous 
blunders, flip-flops and controversies (such as the plagiarism in 
his doctoral thesis) are becoming a burden to the party. However, 
Danko has been working to regain the confidence of voters, and 
enjoys performing as the defender of Slovak interests against the 
predations of foreign corporations and a proponent of strong rela-
tions with Russia.
The rhetoric and manifestoes of Smer and the SNS are most suc-
cessful with older voters, especially in the poorer and more con-
servative eastern part of the country and on the Slovak-Polish-
Czech border (the Kysuce region). In those areas, they also benefit 
from extensive party structures at the local level: Smer alone 
has more than 15,000 members, by far the most of all the politi-
cal groups. However, its narrowing electoral base means that 
although the party is still the leader in the polls, it has now lost 
the recent European elections, the last two presidential elections 
and is winning ever fewer deputies’ seats (in the 2016 elections) 
and positions in regional (2017) and municipal (2018) councils. 
In recent years, the share among the party’s supporters of peo-
ple aged 60 and over has risen significantly (from more than 30% 
in 2012 to 51% in 2019). The percentage of voters who completed 
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secondary education without graduating has also risen (from 30% 
in the previous two parliamentary elections to 43% now), while 
the share of those with higher education has dropped (from over 
19% to less than 15% today). At the same time, the presidential and 
European elections have shown that the turnout in the strongly 
pro-Smer east of the country was much lower than in the oppo-
sition-oriented Bratislava, which indicates the limits Fico’s party 
faces in mobilising its voter base.
Figure 1. Changes in the age structure of Smer’s electorate
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Figure 2. Changes in the education levels of Smer’s electorate
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III. The cenTre-rIghT opposITIon and 
The new polITIcal forces: The sTruggle 
‘for a decenT slovakIa’
The support Zuzana Čaputová received in the second round of 
the elections (58.4%) largely reflects the scale of support for the 
broader opposition, which wants to change the establishment and 
repair the state, but not the political system as a whole. The oppo-
sition is united in its very harsh criticism of Smer and its willing-
ness to side with the demands voiced during the protests under 
the slogan of ‘For a decent Slovakia’ which began in spring 2018.
For years, however, the opposition has suffered from serious 
problems, including its lack of cohesion, personal disputes, and 
significant political differences concerning the parties’ econom-
ic, ideological, and European agendas12. This internal friction, 
including at the personal level, has been effectively exploited by 
Smer, which portrays the opposition as incapable of cooperation 
and discredited by its many scandals. Richard Sulík ran the main 
opposition force in the parliament from his seat as an MEP from 
2014 to 2019; his group Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS) isan 
economically and ideologically/culturally liberal party which 
opposes further European integration (and can count on around 
7–9% of support in the polls). Smer still claims that a few years ago 
(when he was the head of the junior coalition party) he discussed 
nominations for the position of Attorney General with Kočner, 
who is currently accused of ordering Kuciak’s murder. 
Igor Matovič, the head of the next biggest opposition group in 
the parliament, Ordinary People and Independent Personali-
ties (OĽaNO, with about 6% support) has been criticised for his 
12 The various right-wing opposition groups identify with various European 
political families: the Christian Democrat EPP (KDH, Spolu, Most-Híd, SMK-
MKP, OĽaNO, and probably Andrej Kiska’s party as well); the conservative 
ECR (SaS), the liberal ALDE (PS) and the new Eurosceptic EAPN group cre-
ated by the Italian deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini (Sme Rodina). 
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scandalous statements and sudden U-turns, even by members of 
his own group. His credibility as a fighter for honesty and trans-
parency in politics took a hit when he was fined for combining his 
parliamentary work with business activity. 
For his part, the celebrity and businessman Boris Kollár, who 
leads the We Are Family grouping (Sme Rodina, 6–7% support), 
years ago had close contacts with the former leader of the Brati-
slava underworld, and has primarily promoted himself through 
articles in the tabloid press in which he talks about his numerous 
children (10 from 9 women). Kollár has declared that he entered 
into politics in order to “defend the Slovaks against the migrants 
and oligarchs” to whom the “standard politicians” are beholden. 
In contrast to Smer and its coalition partner the SNS, the op-
position groups have small membership bases (for example, in 
2018 OĽaNO had only 13 party members) and poorly developed re-
gional structures (with the exception of the Christian Democratic 
Movement, KDH – see below).
The weakness of the parliamentary opposition means that Slovaks 
are willing to support new political entities. In every parliamen-
tary election since 2010 at least one new group has won seats, and 
this situation is likely to be repeated in the elections in spring 2020. 
The parties most likely to succeed this time are Progressive Slova-
kia (PS), and the centrist Together (Spolu), both established at the 
turn of 2018; these two ran as a coalition in the May elections to 
the European Parliament13 and together gained about 15–16% sup-
port in the polls. The creators and leaders of PS are businessmen 
linked to the IT industry, whereas Spolu was founded by politicians 
from other centre-right formations. A characteristic of both par-
ties is that key positions in them are occupied by people in their 
13 These parties have not yet competed in parliamentary elections, but due to 
some deputies changing their party affiliation, Spolu currently has six seats 
in parliament, and PS one. 
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thirties and forties, mostly from Bratislava, often with expert or 
business experience. Until recently this group also included Zuza-
na Čaputová, although she resigned from membership of the party 
after her victory in the presidential elections. They have promised 
voters greater transparency in the functioning of government and 
public institutions, which is intended to help create a fair and ef-
fective state. Spolu presents itself as a centre-right party, whereas 
Progressive Slovakia is consciously avoiding easy classification. 
At the European level, PS has joined the liberal ALDE group, and in 
its manifesto it has linked its demand to expand the range of incen-
tives for business with a strong emphasis on equal opportunities 
for all citizens, as well as environmental protection measures.
Another party which stands a chance of entering parliament in 
the next election is For People (Za ľudí) announced by Andrej 
Kiska in the twilight of his presidential term. His grouping has 
a centrist profile, and is currently polling at about 6–11%,attract-
ing voters mainly from the PS-Spolu coalition and SaS. In contrast 
to the former, though, Kiska cannot present himself as a new face 
in politics. During his presidency, Kiska struggled with numer-
ous accusations from Smer, concerning the murky acquisition of 
a plot of land in his native Poprad, as well as tax offences. Stripped 
of presidential immunity, Kiska will be an even easier target for 
serious political attacks.
Changes have also occurred recently among the groups seeking 
conservative voters. The challenge for them, on the one hand, is 
the fight against the new president’s ‘ultraliberalism’ as declared 
by Fico, and on the other the growing popularity of the ‘anti-sys-
tem’ representatives, who are increasingly drawing upon tradi-
tional values. After the elections in 2016, Slovakia’s traditional 
Christian Democratic grouping, the Christian Democratic Move-
ment (KDH), lost all its parliamentary seats14, but most surveys 
14 In parliament the KDH is currently represented by one deputy who was 
elected from a different group’s party list.
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indicate that they will regain some of them in next year’s elec-
tions. They achieved good results during the May elections to 
the European Parliament, where they received nearly 10% of the 
vote, despite competition from the newly founded Christian Un-
ion; this group was created by defectors from KDH and OĽaNO 
who accused their old parties of passivity in implementing their 
ideological demands. The new party, which got 3.8% of the vote 
(and thus did not win any seats), did however succeed in splitting 
the conservative electorate, primarily taking votes from OĽaNO 
(which got only 5.3%). 
The shake-up among the parties drawing upon Christian values 
has been  accompanied since the beginning of this century by a de-
cline in the number of believers declaring attachment to the major 
Christian denominations15. This has coincided with new trends in 
relations between the church hierarchy and the politicians. Coop-
eration between bishops and the KDH under the chairmanship of 
Alojz Hlina has been weakening; meanwhile, the voices of priests 
who are sympathetic to the anti-system forces have been getting 
louder (for example via social networks). The Catholic hierarchy 
also faces the dilemma of how to respond to Čaputová, whose lib-
eral views on some issues run contrary to the Church’s teachings, 
but whose will to fight abuses of power against vulnerable people 
has the sympathy of many Slovak Catholics. While she was cam-
paigning as deputy head of Progressive Slovakia she received sup-
port from the former ordinary of Trnava diocese Róbert Bezák, 
but his successor in this position, Ján Orosch, strongly discour-
aged support for ‘ultra-liberal’ candidates. According to polls, 
in the first round of the presidential elections Čaputová won the 
15 According to the last census (of 2011), 62% of Slovaks declare Roman Catholic 
religion, 5.9% belong to the largest Lutheran Church, and 3.8% are Greek 
Catholics; atheists represent 13.4% of the population. These are worse results 
for the three major Christian churches than 10 years previously (68.9, 6.9 and 
4.1%), but both Catholic denominations did better than in 1991 (60.4 and 3.4%; 
the percentage of Lutherans was 6.2%). The percentage of atheists is gradu-
ally increasing (from 9.8% in 1991, and 13% in 2001).
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support of 36% of Catholics and 42% of Protestants (and won 57% 
and 58% respectively in the second round).
Decreasing support for Smer in recent years has opened up 
a chance for the right-wing opposition to remove it from power. 
However, the parties need at least to halt their mutual attacks and 
agree on a pre-election strategy, which the Slovak political lead-
ers are increasingly beginning to realise. This process is taking 
place only slowly, however, and is occurring in parallel with the 
fragmentation of the party scene due to the creation of new po-
litical formations. This joining of forces was initiated by the coali-
tion between PS and Spolu in February 2019, and these hitherto 
marginal projects are now, as a coalition, the strongest opponents 
to Smer. Talks on possible cooperation between this bloc and the 
party of former President Kiska are proceeding, while OĽaNO is 
discussing a coalition with the KDH and the SMK-KMP, repre-
senting the Hungarian minority, but which has remained outside 
the parliament since 2012. Difficult decisions also lie ahead for the 
leadership of the Hungarian/Slovak group Most-Híd which is on 
the verge of the electoral threshold. Most-Híd was part of the rul-
ing coalition with Smer, but before the second round of presiden-
tial elections it declared its support for Čaputová.
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Figure 3. Possible changes in Slovak parliament after 2020 elections
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Iv. The ‘anTI-sysTem’: frusTraTed slovakIa
One consequence of the growing disillusionment with political 
elites in Slovak society, next to the drop in voter turnout and the 
growing popularity of new people in politics, is the rise in support 
for anti-system forces. The main representatives of this trend in 
March’s presidential elections were Štefan Harabin and Marian 
Kotleba, who together received almost a quarter of the vote.
The better result (14.3%) went to Harabin, a controversial Supreme 
Court judge. In the 1990s he worked closely with Prime Minister 
Vladimír Mečiar, whose strong-man rule delayed Slovakia’s inte-
gration into the EU and NATO16. When Harabin was asked during 
the campaign who he thought had been the best Prime Minister of 
Slovakia so far, he named Mečiar; and as the nominee of Mečiar’s 
party he held office as deputy prime minister and justice minister 
in Fico’s first government (2006–9). Since the 1990s Harabin has 
held posts in the country’s most important institutions, although 
for several years he has sharply criticised the whole political 
scene, accusing almost all sides of corruption and betraying the 
nation’s interests. In the presidential elections he found a great 
deal of support among groups of older and poorer voters with no 
college education. His constituency is an unstable mix of support-
ers of the ruling Smer and SNS parties and (to a lesser extent) 
the opposition group Sme Rodina. For them Harabin, presenting 
himself as a competent lawyer who had been fighting the corrupt 
system for years, was a more convincing option than Kotleba, who 
16 Vladimír Mečiar (b. 1942) was Slovak Prime Minister from 1993 to 1998 (with 
a nine-month break in 1994). In the early 1990s, together with the Czech 
Prime Minister Václav Klaus, he was one of the main architects of the divi-
sion of Czechoslovakia, and thus the creation of an independent Slovak state. 
During Mečiar’s rule democratic standards were repeatedly violated; the 
special forces were used to fight his political opponents (as in the case of the 
abduction of President Michal Kováč's son), and the privatisation process led 
to the construction of oligarchic structures. People affiliated with the regime 
still occupy important state bodies, such as Harabin himself, and Jaroslav 
Reznik, the head of the public media.
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as a young radical had been at the forefront of anti-Roma marches 
just a few years previously.
One way in which Harabin’s campaign tried to attract voters was 
his rhetoric of sovereignty. He stressed that Slovakia does not need 
to be clearly anchored in either the West or the East, and should 
pursue a ‘multi-vector’ policy, that is, develop cooperation with both 
NATO and Russia. In this way he appealed to the emotions which 
Mečiar had drawn upon in the 1990s: defending Slovakia’s right to 
choose its own path of transformation, and rejecting the blind imi-
tation of Western models. In fact, Mečiar used such rhetoric to try 
and cover the failure of his foreign policy after the West, in con-
nection with the violation of democratic standards in Slovakia, re-
jected Bratislava’s aspirations to join NATO and the EU in 199517. Just 
as then the slogans Mečiar employed were in line with Moscow’s 
interests, so also now Harabin’s views on international politics are 
largely in line with the Kremlin’s narrative (including criticism of 
the ‘fascist’ government in Ukraine, and denials of the annexation 
of Crimea and of Russia’s participation in shooting down the Malay-
sian aircraft over occupied Ukraine). Harabin’s demands include 
the immediate lifting of EU sanctions against Russia and the de-
militarisation of Central European countries (including the reduc-
tion of Slovakia’s defence spending, in favour of the health service). 
Although he has referred to NATO as “a relic that will disappear 
over time”, that has not prevented him from suggesting that Russia 
could join NATO someday. Harabin has not demanded that Slovakia 
should simply leave the EU, but claims that the Slovak position is 
“shameful”, and that the government accepts the “diktat of Brus-
sels”. He has spread rumours that “thousands of migrants” are al-
ready in or will soon arrive in Slovakia. He has also tried to convince 
his electorate that Slovakia should get the EU to limit its actions to 
economic issues, and that at any moment Bratislava may revoke 
its consent to the transfer of some national competences to the EU.
17 A. Duleba, ‘Slovenská zahraničná politika – bilancia šiestich rokov a pers-
pektivy zmeny’, Mezinárodní vztahy, 1999, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 36–54.
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Marian Kotleba is the chairman of the People’s Party-Our Slovakia 
(ĽSNS), whose roots lie in extreme groups drawing upon Slovak 
nationalism and even neo-Nazi traditions. In the first round of the 
presidential elections he won 10.4% of the vote. Kotleba’s electoral 
base is made up of ĽSNS voters, a stable and well-motivated group 
of supporters, which is popular especially among younger (under 
30), less-educated voters.
A factor contributing to the political success of Kotleba and his 
party include the coexistence of the Slovak and Roma communi-
ties, a controversial subject in the country. Slovakia has the second 
highest percentage (9%) of Roma population in the EU (after Bul-
garia), among which the employment rate is only 25% (compared 
to 68% in Slovak society in general)18. The Roma are particularly 
numerous in the areas of the Banská Bystrica region which were 
hardest hit by the economic transformation of the 1990s, and it was 
this region which became the cradle of ĽSNS. Until 2017 Kotleba 
headed the regional government there, and during the 2016 elec-
tions his party openly declared a fight against ‘the parasites from 
the [Roma] settlements’ and crimes committed by Roma.
ĽSNS also benefits from the consistently positive image among part 
of Slovak society of the Slovak State (or First Slovak Republic, 1939-
45), which was subordinate to the Third Reich, and of its leader Fa-
ther Jozef Tiso, who was jointly responsible for crimes including the 
deportation of Slovakia’s Jewish population to the death camps. 19% 
and 9% of Slovaks respectively have, like Kotleba, a positive opinion 
of the Slovak State and Tiso19. The radicalism of some of ĽSNS’s de-
mands led to the General Prosecutor’s Office filing an application in 
18 OCED Economic Surveys: Slovak Republic 2019, OCED, Paris 2019; read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-slovak-republic-2019_eco_
surveys-svk-2019-en#page2read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-econom-
ic-surveys-slovak-republic-2019_eco_surveys-svk-2019-en#page2.
19 ‘Osudové osmičky v historickém vědomí české a slovenské veřejnosti: událos-
ti, období, osobnosti’, CVVM, 12 June 2018; https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/
com_form2content/documents/c2/a4645/f9/pd180612.pdf.
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2017 to dissolve the party on the grounds of its extremism and ‘fa-
scistic tendencies’, but towards the end of April 2019 the Supreme 
Court definitively rejected this application20.
The success in court has not only legitimised the presence of Kot-
leba’s party on the political scene, but has also helped it to gradu-
ally move away from its extremist positions toward the centre. 
For a long time ĽSNS has been softening its rhetoric and anti-Ro-
ma slogans, focusing instead on the ‘defence of national interests 
and traditions’. This has helped the party to broaden its electorate; 
during the first round of presidential elections this helped Kot-
leba to second place among unemployed voters, but also with rich-
er Slovaks (those whose net earnings exceed €1200 per month). 
Support for ĽSNS is also growing among the elderly and women, 
who had hitherto been distrustful of Kotleba. At the same time 
the party is managing to reach both practicing Catholics (24% of 
its votes) and atheists (31% of its votes)21.
The level of support for Kotleba has remained firm, despite the me-
dia coverage and political ostracism and marginalisation of the party 
(ĽSNS is commonly called a ‘fascist’ party). Regardless, support for 
the party since the 2016 parliamentary elections (when it got 8%) has 
risen to 11.5–14%22, usually making it the third political force in the 
country (see Figure 4). Kotleba’s party came third in May’s European 
parliamentary elections, and its result of 12.1% is its best yet in national 
elections. The main threat to Kotleba’s party in the ‘anti-system’ field 
(and also to Smer, to some degree) may come from a group led by Hara-
bin, although it is not yet certain whether such a party will be formed.
20 In 2006, the Supreme Court dissolved the previous group led by Marian 
Kotleba (Slovenská pospolitosť–Národná strana, Slovak Community-National 
Party). Since then, extremist circles have begun to attach even greater im-
portance to ensuring that the wording in the official documents did not con-
stitute grounds for the proscription of their structures.
21 M. Hanus, ‘Kotleba je už uprostred nás a len tak ľahko neodíde’, Postoj, 14 May 2019, 
https://www.postoj.sk/43367/kotleba-je-uz-uprostred-nas-a-len-tak-lahko-odide.
22 The party got 13.9% in a poll in May by AKO, and 12.5% in the June poll by Focus.
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Figure 4. Support for ĽSNS in 2015–19
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Both Harabin and Kotleba owe their popularity to their appear-
ances in media which are building up their position as alterna-
tives to the mainstream media. When discussing foreign affairs, 
these media often spread conspiracy theories and views which fit 
the Kremlin’s narrative (see Box); they help these politicians to at-
tract a large part of Slovak voters who feel they are victims of the 
economic transformation and are afraid of the changes associated 
with globalisation.
They believe that foreign capital is draining the country’s econo-
my: for example, Kotleba’s party has challenged the legitimacy of 
the significant incentives granted to foreign investors (the Jaguar 
Land Rover plant in Nitra, which started work in autumn 2018, 
has received support estimated at half a billion euros). According 
to polling in 2018 a third of Slovaks assess the state’s economic 
situation negatively, which is by far the worst result among the 
countries of the Visegrád Group23.
23 In the poll, 28% of Slovaks felt the country’s economic situation was good 
or very good, and 34% saw it as bad or very bad. In all other countries in the 
region the positive number outweighed the negative: in Hungary 29% to 20%, 
in the Czech Republic 44% to 15%, and in Poland 57% to 7%. See ‘Hodnocení 
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The media and politicians who have most harshly criticised the 
current course of the country’s development are the most vocal 
exponents of these problems, which are thus becoming an ever 
greater part of the mainstream debate. Slovak economists have 
drawn attention to the risks associated with the national econ-
omy’s very large and growing dependence on one branch of in-
dustry: Slovakia was the largest producer of cars per capita in the 
world even before the launch of the Jaguar factory, and VW alone 
is responsible for 10% of Slovak exports. At the same time, the 
domestic added value in exports (55%) is the lowest in the OECD 
(for example, Poland’s is 73%); this means that exports, which 
are often costly, only improve the local population’s situation to 
a small extent.
Media	disinformation	in	Slovakia
In Slovakia media services which present themselves as inde-
pendent alternatives to the mainstream media are relatively 
popular, and they present a perspective which is close to that 
of the Kremlin. The most widely followed of these is Hlavné 
správy, which describes itself as a ‘conservative daily’; it has 
about 1 million readers per month, and is the third most vis-
ited news website. The liberal media have revealed a range 
of evidence demonstrating that its editorial board has ties to 
Kremlin-linked Russians. Another popular pro-Russian ser-
vice is Parlamentné listy (with about 170,000 readers), which 
– like its Czech counterpart – is owned by the Czech Senator 
Ivo Valenta (a member of the Senate group of the right-wing 
ODS party). The Russian Sputnik agency has a section on Slo-
vakia on its Czech webpage. The left-wing weekly Slovo and its 
associated website also publish pro-Kremlin content. The pop-
ular Internet radio station Slobodný vysielač is important for 
ekonomické situace a materiálních životních podanek v středoevropském 
srovnání – leden 2018’, CVVM, 28 March 2018; cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_
form2content/documents/c2/a4566/f9/ev180328.pdf.
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the alternative, pro-Kremlin media, as it has helped promote 
Štefan Harabin as one of the leading anti-system figures. Mar-
ian Kotleba is also a frequent guest on the station. The suscep-
tibility of Slovaks to the misinformation and conspiracy theo-
ries propagated in the above-mentioned media is evidenced by 
the results of a poll concerning the anti-government protests 
in spring 2018; up to 35% of respondents believed that the 
demonstrations were being controlled from abroad. 
Harabin and Kotleba’s manifestoes have many features in com-
mon, although any alliance between them would be effectively 
impeded by each man’s political ambitions and mutual distrust. 
Both make heavy use of ideological topics, presenting themselves 
as defenders of traditional values  and outlining a vision wherein 
the five million Slovaks would be absorbed and dispersed in the 
liberal Western world. The two leaders of the anti-system part of 
society argue that Slovakia must defend its sovereignty against 
both Brussels and Washington. Kotleba attracts voters who prefer 
a more radical solution. His party collected signatures for a pro-
posal to hold a referendum on Slovakia leaving the EU; after this 
initiative failed, he has now proposed organising a referendum 
on leaving NATO. For this part of the electorate, cooperation with 
Harabin would be risky, because the latter – as a politician who 
supported membership of the eurozone and the Lisbon Treaty in 
the past – would appear unreliable, and too much a part of the 
system which he has been criticising.
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v. prospecTs for change 
The parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2020 will see 
a clash between three political camps: the ruling camp, made up 
of increasingly conservative social democrats and nationalists; 
the centre-right and liberal opposition, which is bound together 
almost exclusively by its harsh criticism of Fico’s party; and the 
anti-system forces, who are growing in strength despite the coun-
try’s strong economic performance. The final form of these camps 
is still not a foregone conclusion, and reshuffles within their 
ranks will continue. There are signs that Smer will try to intro-
duce a narrative into the election campaign of fighting in defence 
of its social policies and the traditional values which (according to 
Smer) are threatened by the centre-right and liberal opposition. 
They, in turn, will stress the need for healing the state and holding 
accountable of those guilty of abuses of power under Smer.
The opinion polls, less than a year before the parliamentary elec-
tions, give the centre-right and liberal parties a good chance of 
forming the future government. However, this will probably re-
quire a broad alliance of at least four groups with very diverse 
political platforms, which means any such coalition would be ex-
posed to regular turbulence. Crucial in the post-election arithme-
tic will be the number of seats gained by Kotleba’s party, which at 
present has zero coalition potential. If it (and possibly also Hara-
bin’s group) achieves great success, some elements of the oppo-
sition would consider possible cooperation with Smer. However, 
a pre-condition for the establishment of such a pro-European 
and pro-Atlantic coalition would probably be the removal of Fico 
and Kaliňák from their leadership positions in Smer. In order to 
protect himself against such a scenario and stay in power, Fico 
could make far-reaching concessions in talks with those groups 
who have not definitively ruled out entering into a coalition with 
Smer (such as Sme Rodina); however, he could also examine the 
option of establishing a minority government with the support of 
Kotleba’s party. This possibility was indicated by the cooperation 
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between Smer and ĽSNS in some votes in parliament. However 
the price for such an alliance would be high: Slovakia would re-
ceive serious criticism from its European partners, Smer would 
have problems with other European social democratic parties, 
and would face resistance from the majority of Slovak society, 
which showed in 2018 that it is fully able to mobilise and hold 
mass protests.
KrzySztof	Dębiec,	JaKub	GroSzKowSKi
